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CASENOTES

CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION v. GUERRA:* SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMS CALIFORNIA'S EFFORTS TO
ACCOMMODATE PREGNANCY IN FAIR
EMPLOYMENT LAWS
In 1978, Congress enacted The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"),' which amended Title VIP of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
* 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
1. Section 701(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), provides in
relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1976). Congress adopted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in all industries affecting interstate commerce. Id. §§
2000e(b), 2000e-2. Title VII imposed a new set of obligations on employers, labor
unions, and employment agencies not to discriminate in their hiring, firing, or other
terms and conditions of employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Id. Title VII gave employees, job applicants, and minority groups a new right
to be free from employment discrimination and to have equal employment opportunities. Id. Title VII created procedures for enforcing these rights through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. § 2000e-4. The EEOC is an
independent commission consisting of five presidentially appointed members. Id. §
2000e-4(a).
The Congressional passage of Title VII has a complicated legislative history. See
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 BOST. C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 431 (1966). The
antecedent of the current act was proposed by President Kennedy in 1963 as part of a
broad program of civil rights legislation. Id. at 432. The House Bill was passed first.
Id. at 443. The Senate debated for 83 days and made substantial amendments to the
original House Bill. Id. at 443-57. Floor debate and memoranda from Senate floor
managers produced the relevant legislative history. Id. at 457. The Senate, finally,
passed a compromise bill, which the House adopted without further amendments. Id.
President Johnson signed the bill and Title VII became effective July 2, 1965. Id.
In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261 §§ 2-4
(1972) (codified, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1976)), extensively
amended Title VII. The amendments gave the EEOC power to file suit, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f); extended Title VII to cover state and local governments, id. § 2000e(a);
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("Title VIrP. In enacting the PDA, Congress expanded the term
"sex" in section 703-(a)(1)" of Title VII to include a prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.' In CaliforniaFederal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,' the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the PDA, in amending Title VII, preempted section 12945(b)(2), 7 of California's Fair
and proscribed separate enforcement procedures for federal employers, id. § 2000e16. The amendments provided additional Congressional reports. These reports produced more legislative history to guide the EEOC and the judiciary, particularily in
the areas of sex and religious discrimination.
A major interpretative question evolved from Title VII as to what extent the
statute applied to pregnancy distinctions. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

LAw 30 (2d ed. 1984). Three major United States Supreme Court cases were the catalyst for the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which further
amended Title VII. First, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court found
that a state employee insurance plan which excluded pregnancy benefits, did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The second case was a
Title VII action, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that
excluding pregnancy benefits from a private employer's disability benefits program
was not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. The third case, Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), held that denying a pregnant worker's seniority
credit after a pregnancy leave was a form of sex discrimination within the meaning of
Title VII. Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982), in reaction to these decisions. See infra note 43 (discussing why Congress
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act). Title VII, as amended, now includes the
prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1976). This casenote focuses only on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Title VII, however, is but one segment of the
comprehensive Civil Rights Act. Other titles of the Civil Rights Act include the prohibition against discrimination in public accommodation, id. § 2000a; access to public
facilities, id. § 2000b; desegration of public schools, id. § 2000c; and the prohibition
against discrimination under federally assisted programs, id. §2000d.
4. Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
,liscriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
5. See supra note 1 for the PDA text which should be read in conjunction with
§ 703(a) of Title VII.
6. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). Section 12945(b)(2) provides in
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification: ....

(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ....

(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of
time; provided, such period shall not exceed four months .... Reason-

able period of time means that period during which the female em-
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Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). s Section 12945(b)(2) required employers to provide female employees with a reasonable
pregnancy leave not exceeding four months.9 This section also required employers to reinstate female workers upon their return to
work from a pregnancy leave.' ° The Court resolved the preemption
issue in favor of the FEHA," holding that the PDA did not preempt
section 12945(b)(2) because the state statute was consistent with the
purpose of the federal statute."5 The Court further held that section
12945(b)(2) did not require employers to commit acts unlawful
under Title VII."5 In so holding, the Court properly determined that
Title VII and the PDA do not prohibit, under certain circumstances,
preferential state treatment of the condition of pregnancy.
In January 1982, Lillian Garland, an employee of California
Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Cal Fed"), took a pregnancy disability leave."' In April 1982, Garland notified Cal Fed that
she was able to return to work."5 Cal Fed"0 informed Garland that
her position had been filled and that a similar position was not
available.1 7 Garland then filed a complaint with The California Deployee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions....
An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pursuant to this subdivision to give the employer reasonable notice of the date such
leave shall commence and the estimated duration of such leave.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 and Supp. 1986), [hereinafter
FEHA] is California's comprehensive law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition,
marital status, sex, or age. Id.
9. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the "Commission"), is the
state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 687 & n.4. The
parties stipulated that the Commission's interpretation of § 12945(b)(2) required employers to extend reasonable pregnancy leave and reinstatement after a pregnancy
leave to the same or similar position the employee occupied prior to her pregnancy
leave. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 695. Mark Guerra is California's Director of the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing. Id. Co-defendants were Fair Employment and Housing
Commission of the State of California, and Cruz F. Sandoval, as Chair Commissioner
of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. Id. at 683.
12. Id. at 695.
13. Id. at 694, 695.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id.
16. Cal Fed had a facially neutral leave policy. Id. This policy allowed employees, who had completed three months of service, to take unpaid leaves of absence for
temporary disabilities and pregnancy. Id. Although Cal Fed would try to reinstate
employees returning from a leave of absence, Cal Fed expressly reserved the right to
terminate an employee if a similar position was not available. Id. Cal Fed reinstated
Garland in November 1982. Id. at 688 n.7.
17. See Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1987, § 4, at 4, which noted that Garland lost
custody of her child to her ex-husband, because she was not immediately reinstated.
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partment of Fair Employment and Housing ("Department").18 The
Department charged Cal Fed with violating section 12945(b)(2) of
the FEHA, and scheduled a hearing before the Fair Housing and

Employment Commission.19
Prior to the hearing, Cal Fed 2 ° brought an action against the
Department in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.2 1 Cal Fed sought a declaration that Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, preempted section 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA,
thus enjoining its enforcement. 22 The district court granted Cal
Fed's motion for summary judgment.22 The district court reasoned
that employers who complied with section 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA
were subject to a claim of reverse sex discrimination under Title

VII.24 The court concluded that Title VII preempted section
12945(b)(2) of the FEHA, which required preferential treatment of

pregnant employees, and was, therefore, null and void under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court.26 In a strongly worded opinion, the court
stated that the district court's conclusion that section 12945(b)(2)

discriminated against men defied common sense and flouted Title
18. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
19. Id.
20. Petitioner Cal Fed was a Los Angeles based, federally chartered savings and
loan association. Id. at 687, 688. Cal Fed was joined by petitioner Merchants and
Manufacturers Association, a trade association representing various California employers; and petitioner California Chamber of Commerce, which also represented various California employers. Id. at 688 & n.8. Petitioners, or their members, had
facially neutral leave policies and were subject to liability under both Title VII and §
12945(b)(2). Id. at 688 & n.8.
21. Id. at 688.
22. Id.
23. Id. After the district court's judgment, Garland moved to intervene in the
action. Id. at 688, 689 n.11. The district court denied her motion on several grounds
including the defendant's adequate representation of her interests. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention. Id.
Garland did not appeal. Id.
24. Id. at 688. The district court relied on Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983). The Newport Court held that an insurance
plan which gave female employees pregnancy coverage but did not give equal coverage to spouses of male employees, was sex discrimination against male employees. Id.
at 688 n.10. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of
Newport.
25. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 688. The Supremacy Clause, art. VI, cl. 2, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

26. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
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VII. 27 The court found that the PDA did not demand that a state's

laws be blind to pregnancy's existence.2" Rather, the court concluded
that "Congress intended to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy disabilities may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may
not rise." 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 0 In addressing the preemption issue, the Court determined that Congress
did not intend to preempt a state's fair employment laws unless the
laws were inconsistent with Title VII's purpose."1 The Court also determined that Title VII would not preempt a state law unless the
two laws actually conflicted." The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit
and held that Title VII did not preempt section 12945(b)(2) because
it was not inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII."3
The Court, in first examining the general preemption doctrine, 4
determined that Congress did not expressly intend to preempt state
fair employment laws, 5 nor did Congress intend to occupy the field
of fair employment laws. 8 The Court, however, did find that if a
27. Guerra, 758 F.2d at 393.
28. Id. at 395.
29. Id. at 396. See Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 175, 196 (1981-82). Williams advocates an equal treatment approach to pregnancy rights, stating that the PDA not only
created the desired floor under the pregnant women's rights, but also the ceiling. Id.
at 196. Although the court of appeals used this floor/ceiling analogy, it reversed Williams' reasoning. See generally Note, CaliforniaFederal Savings & Loan Association
v. Guerra: The State of California Has Determined That Pregnancy May Be Hazardous To Your Job, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 515, 525 n.6. [hereinafter Pregnancy
Hazards]. (casenote on the court of appeals' Guerra decision).
30. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
31. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 690. The Guerra Court construed § 1104 of Title XI, a
preemption provision applicable to all titles under the Civil Rights Act. Section 1104
provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title
operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall
any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State
law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act,
or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1976).
32. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689. The Guerra Court construed the preemption provision of Title VII. Section 708 provides:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future
law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976).
33. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 695.
34. Id. See generally Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959) (discussing general preemption
doctrine).
35. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 695.
36. Id. at 689. Federal law may supersede state law in different ways. Id. Con-
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state law actually conflicted with Title VII, the state law would be
preempted.87 A conflict with Title VII occurs-if compliance with Title VII and the state law is physically impossible, 8 or if compliance
with the state law frustrates the purpose of Title VII. s With these
preemption standards as a guide, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the PDA and Title VII prohibited a state from enacting
preferential pregnancy disability legislation.4
Cal Fed argued that the plain language of the PDA expressly
forbids preferential treatment of the pregnancy condition.' Rejecting Cal Fed's construction of the PDA, the Court instead looked
to the historical context in which Congress passed the PDA.' 2 The
PDA was Congress' reaction to the decision in General Electric
Company v. Gilbert'4s which held that excluding pregnancy from a
gress may expressly preempt state law. Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.

519 (1977)). The Jones Court held that the Federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
preempted a California flour packaging statute because the California law frustrated
the express purpose of the federal law. Jones, 430 U.S. 519 (1977). Congress may also
intend that a federal regulation occupy the field, and impliedly preempt supplementary state regulations. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citing Rice v. Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247 (1974)). The Rice Court held that the Federal Commodity Exchange Act implied that Congress intended to occupy the field of regulating
trading on the contract market, however, a nonconflicting state law should be left
undisturbed. Rice, 331 U.S. 247 (1974).
37. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 690.
38. Id. at 689. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 143 (1963)). In FloridaLime, Florida avocado growers claimed a federal regulation which certified their avocados as mature preempted a California statute which
had a different standard for measuring an avocado's maturity. FloridaLime, 373 U.S.
at 143. The Florida Lime Court held that the Florida growers could physically comply with both the federal and state laws, therefore, preemption would not apply. Id.
39. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62
(1941)). In Hines, the Alien Registration Act preempted Pennsylvania's strict alien
registration statute because the state law interfered with the full purpose and objectives of the federal law. Hines, 312 U.S. at 74. See also Michigan Canners & Freezers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Agriculture Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (Federal
Agricultural Fair Practices Act preempted a Michigan statute conferring bargaining
authority on agricultural co-operatives); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982) (California Supreme Court imposed restrictions on
the use of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage contracts; the Federal Home Owners Loan
Act of 1933 preempted these restrictions).
40. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
41. Brief for the Petitioners at 18, California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494). See also supra note 1 for the PDA's full text.
42. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
43. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Guerra Court found
that the PDA was passed in reaction to the Gilbert decision. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at
691. See House Comm. on Ed. & Labor, Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on
Pregnancy, H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprintedin [1978] Pregnancy
Benefits & DiscriminationRules, (CCH) 1402, at 53, (Mar. 13, 1978) ("It is the committee's view that the dissenting [Gilbert] Justices correctly interpreted the Act");
Senate Comm. On Human Resources, Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964,
S. REP. No. 95-331, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] Pregnancy Benefits &
Discrimination Rules, (CCH), 1501 at 70-72, (May 18, 1977) (The two dissenting
opinions in the Gilbert case correctly expressed the commonsense view that preg-
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general disability insurance plan was not sex discrimination withing
the meaning of Title VII. The Court concluded that the first clause
of the PDA expressed congressional disapproval of the Gilbert decision."" The second clause overruled Gilbert and provided a remedy
for discrimination based upon pregnancy."5 Based on this construction, the Court determined that the PDA's "same treatment" language was the floor of pregnancy rights"" and the PDA did not,
therefore, expressly forbid preferential treatment.47
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the PDA to support its construction.4 Cal Fed contended that although Congress
intended to end pregnancy discrimination, remedial measures would
not require employers to initiate preferential pregnancy disability
nancy discrimination is sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII; S.995 was
introduced to reflect this commonsense view). See also supra note 2 (discussing the
history of Title VII).
44. For the complete text of the PDA, see supra note 1. The Guerra Court concluded that the PDA's first clause meant that excluding pregnancy from otherwise
complete plans or policies was sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
45. The Guerra Court concluded that Congress intended the second clause to
be an express overruling of Gilbert which excluded pregnancy coverage from a fringe
benefit plan. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 691. The Court further ruled that the same treatment language used in the PDA is the minimum requirement for remedying pregnancy discrimination . Id. at 691-92.
46. Id. at 692.
47. The Court relied on commentators who interpreted the second clause of the
PDA to mandate at least equal treatment but not prohibit special treatment. Id. at
692 n.16 (citing Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 690, 696, & n.26 (1983); Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 937 (1985)). But see Williams,
Equity's Riddle, 13 N.Y.U.L. REV. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985) (comment in support of
the same treatment approach).
48. To support the remedy construction of the PDA, the Court focused upon
the legislative history of the PDA. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 692 & n.18. The reports,
debates, and hearings clearly stated that Congress intended to provide relief for pregnant workers and to put an end to pregnancy discrimination. Id. See 124 CONG. REC.
S36819 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (bill will end "major source of discrimination unjustly afflicting working women in America"); 124 CONG. REc. H21437 (1978)
(remarks of Rep. Quie) (bill is "necessary in order for women employees to enjoy
equal treatment in fringe benefit programs"); 124 CONG. REc. H21439 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Akaka) ("bill simply requires that pregnant workers be fairly and equally
treated"); 124 CONG. REc. H21440 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords
some 41% of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection and security
without fear of reprisal due to their decision to bear children"); 124 CONG. REc.
H21442 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill would put an end to an unrealistic and
unfair system that forces women to choose between family and career - clearly a function of sex bias in the law"); 124 CONG. REC. S38574 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
(the "bill represents only basic fairness for women employees"); 124 CONG. REC.
H38574 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (subcommittee "learned of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we learned of the hardships
this discrimination brought to women and their families"); 123 CONG. REc. S8144
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (legislation "will end employment discrimination
against pregnant workers").

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:181

plans. 4' The Court rejected this contention and concluded that "[i]f
Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would
have been the height of understatement to say only that the legisla-

tion would not require such conduct."

0

The Court further denied preemption because section
12945(b)(2) did not frustrate the purpose or objectives of Title VII. 5'
The Court found that the federal and state law shared the common
purpose of promoting equal employment opportunity. 52 The Califor49. Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494). Cal Fed relied on the PDA's legislative history
that emphasized that employers would not be required to treat pregnant workers in
any particular manner. Id. See 124 CONG. REc. H6863 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) ("This legislation would not require an employer to have a temporary disability
plan or provide other employee benefits"); 124 CONG. REC. H6864 (1978) (remarks of
Rep. Sarasin) (the law "would not require any coverage at all where no temporary
disability, or sick leave . . . is provided"); 123 CONG. REC. S15037 (1977) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh) ("Nothing under this legislation would require a company to offer . . . a
disability plan"). See also H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4750, 4751 (the bill "does not require employers to
treat employees in any particular manner"); S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) (the bill "rejects the view that employers may treat pregnancy . . . as sui
generis").
50. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 693 (emphasis in original). The Court relied upon the
fact that Congress knew of current state legislation similar to California's law. Id. at
693 n.23, 24. See 123 CONG. REC. S29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("several
state legislators. . . have chosen to address the problem by mandating certain types
of benefits for pregnant employees"); S. REP No. 331, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977)
(several "states have already mandated a policy of nondiscrimination. . . two states,
New Jersey and Hawaii, . . . affirmatively require that benefits be provided for pregnancy disabilities"); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) ("at least 22
states . . . now mandate some form of pregnancy disability coverage"). Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Montana have laws similar to California's in that they mandate a
reasonable pregnancy leave and require reinstatement after a pregnany leave. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7) (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 49-2-311 (1986). These laws were in effect prior
to the passage of the PDA and Congress did not indicate in any manner that these
laws would be in conflict with the PDA. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
51. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 693.
52. Id. The Court relied on case law and legislative history that clearly established the purpose of Title VII and the PDA as being the promotion of equal opportunity of employment. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). The
Griggs Court stated that Title VIi's purpose was to achieve equality of employment
opportunity and to remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of employees over other employees. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. See also
Hinshon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 n.7 (1984) (Title Vl1's purpose of equal
employment opportunity includes all the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment); Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co, 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (Congress intended to prohibit all employment practices which create inequality in employment opportunity); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)
(Congress enacted Title VII to assure equality of employment opportunity); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (the language of Title VII
makes plain the purpose of Congress was to assure equality of employment opportunities). See generally 124 CONG. REc. H6803 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) ("genuine equality in the American labor force is . . . an illusion as long as employers
remain free to make pregnancy the basis of unfavorable treatment of working
women"); 123 CONG. REC. S15053 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("the entire
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nia law was consistent with Title VII because the law allowed
women to participate equally with men in the work place, without
denying women the right to have families."3
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether section
12945(b)(2) compelled employers to violate Title VII.5" The Court
concluded that even if it accepted Cal Fed's equal treatment construction of the PDA, compliance with both laws would not be physically impossible."5 Employers were free to provide similar benefits
to other temporarily disabled workers, thereby treating everyone
equally and complying with both laws." The PDA, however, did not
prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy. Employers, therefore,
would not violate Title VII if they did not extend similar benefits to
other temporarily disabled employees. 57
The Court correctly held that the PDA does not preempt a
state's fair employment law that attempts to treat pregnancy more
favorably than other temporary disabilities. Despite criticism that
thrust behind ...this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate
fully and equally in the workforce without denying them the fundamental right to
full participation in family life").
For a discussion of the purpose of California's FEHA, see Price v. Civil Service
Comm., 26 Cal.3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
811 (1980) (the objective of the FEHA is a society in which equal employment opportunity is a reality). See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980) which declares that
the public policy of the state is to protect the right and opportunity to hold employment without discrimination.
53. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
54. Cal Fed contended that the California law could not be harmonized with the
federal law. Brief for Petitioners at 35, California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 107 S.
Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494). Cal Fed argued that if employers extended a benefit to
pregnant workers, they will violate Title VII if they do not extend the same benefit to
other temporarily disabled workers. Id.
55. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 695. See supra note 38 (physical compliance with state
and federal law possible).
56. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 695. The Court was not advocating an extension remedy. Id. A statute must first be invalidated before the remedial measure of extension
could be applied. Id. (citing Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1979)). The
Califano Court found the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act unconstitutional because the gender qualification was not substantially related to an important
government interest and, thereafter, extended benefits to the needy families of unemployed mothers as well as the needy families of unemployed fathers. Califano, 443
U.S. at 89.
The Guerra Court did not invalidate § 12945(b)(2), nor did the Court extend §
12945(b)(2)'s benefits to other disabled employee's. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 695. The
Court did state, however, that employers were free to give comparable benefits to
other disabled persons. Id. The dissent labeled this statement as the majority's
equally "strange ground" for upholding §12945(b)(2). Id. at 701 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent misconstrued this statement. The Court was not applying the extension remedy. The Court assumed, arguendo, that even if it agreed with petitioner's
construction of the PDA, compliance with both statutes was not physically impossible. Id. at 694. The Court, however, did not accept Cal Fed's construction of the
PDA. Therefore, the extension remedy was unnecessary. Id.
57. Id. at 695. See also id. at 697 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the Court prematurely interpreted the PDA,55 the Guerra Court
quieted conflict over the PDA's scope.5 First, the Court accurately
applied previous precedent which had interpreted the PDA. The
Court was not, therefore, without guidance in making its decision.
Second, the Court correctly analyzed Congress' intent in enacting
Title VII. Thus, the Court considered the original goals influencing
Title VII's creation. Third, the Court's opinion developed guidelines
for states that desire a more favorable approach to the treatment of
pregnancy in their laws and policies. In so doing, the Court settled
an area of law wrought with confusion. Finally, Justice Steven's concurring opinion correctly analogized an affirmative action case to the
Guerra issue. Thus, the Court recognized that preferential treatment may in fact further the goal of equal employment opportunity.
Because of the Guerra Court's analysis, state legislatures will now be
able to include favorable treatment of pregnancy in their fair employment laws and policies and not be in conflict with the federal
law.60
58.

Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that

"[tihe majority ...

decides more than is necessary .... I am fully aware that it is

more convenient for the employers of California and California's legislature to have
us interpret the PDA prematurely." Id. Further, Justice Scalia contended that the
majority had issued a prohibited advisory opinion. Id. at 698. His own analysis of the
Guerra case was limited. He stated that section 12945(b)(2) "[c]annot be pre-empted,
since it does not remotely purport to require or permit any refusal to accord federally
mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated. No more is needed to decide
this case." Id. at 697.
59. For an excellent compilation of statistics reflecting the need for a timely
interpretation of the PDA, see Note, Pregnancy Hazards, supra note 29 at 528 nn.
76-79. The number of women in the labor force has increased in the last few years,
four out of five of these new jobs have been in the service area. Most women work in
low-paying jobs without opportunities for advancement, such as waitressing or food
service, health care, clerical or child care work. Id. at 528 n.76 (citations omitted).
Families headed by female householders with no spouse present: 1970, 10.8%; 1980,
14.5 %;1983, 15.4 %.Married coupled families with husband and wife employed: 1970,
29.4%; 1980, 44.8%; 1984, 48.7%. Of married coupled families with the husband unemployed, the percent having only wife employed: 1970, 33.4%; 1980, 39.5%; 1984,
41.7%. The census bureau reported these additional findings for 1984: 28% of the
births by 18 to 24 year olds were to unmarried women; of women past age 30 who
gave birth, 52% were working or looking for work, up from 28% in 1976; women with
no high school diploma had the highest birth rate at 81.9 per 1,000; women with three
years of college or more had the lowest rate with 54.8 per 1,000; women with family
incomes of less than $10,000 had a rate of 88.5 births per 1,000; the rate dropped to
46 births per 1,000 for women in families with an income above $35,000 a year. Id. at
528 n.77 (citiations omitted). Eighty-five percent of working women are likely to become pregnant at least once during their working lives. Id. at 528 n.78 (citation omitted). A study, conducted for the congressional Joint Economic Committee, reported
that the share of national income going to families with children has dropped 19%
since 1973. The statistics indicated that families with single female heads had a mean
income last year of $13,257, less than 40% of the $34,379 average income for twoparent families. Id. at 528 n.79. See generally Bernstein, California Pregnancy Law,
A Step in the Right Direction, Miami Herald, Feb. 1, 1987, § F, at 23. (article emphasizing the need for pregnancy disability laws).
60. See Kleiman, Facing a Fact of Life, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1987, at 1, §

19871

California Savings & Loan v. Guerra

The Court's interpretation of the PDA has, at last, firmly decided the issue that preferential treatment of pregnancy, under certain circumstances, does not discriminate against men. In so doing,
the Guerra Court correctly applied the holding of Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.EEOC.6 ' In Newport, an employer
had a disability insurance plan that covered female employees
claiming pregnancy-related disabilities.62 The insurance plan, however, excluded the wives of male employees from the coverage. The
Newport Court held that providing less pregnancy coverage to the
spouses of male employess was sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.6 3
At first glance, the Newport holding seems to prohibit giving
female employees preferential treatment in pregnancy disability
plans. The Guerra Court, however, properly noted that the California statute was narrowly drawn to cover only actual physical disability brought on by pregnancy.6 4 Men will never become pregnant and,
therefore, do not need pregnancy leave, or reinstatements after pregnancy leaves.6 8 The male employees in Newport were in a similar
situation as their pregnant co-workers.66 Both male employees with
pregnant wives, and pregnant employees themselves, needed pregnancy medical insurance coverage. The Newport Court and the
Guerra Court both concluded that the PDA mandates equal treat7
ment of pregnancy where women and men have equal needs.

4 ("[tlhe Court's decision is having a ripple effect throughout the U.S. as women's
advocacy groups coast to coast organize to introduce legislation similar to the California statute. . . ."). See also Wall St. J., July 21, 1987, § 1, at 1 (mandatory maternal
or parental leave laws were enacted in 5 states this year, 15 states now have laws or
rules on pregnancy leave, and 16 states are considering them).
61. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
Newport is the only prior United States Supreme Court case interpreting the PDA.
Ironically, Newport was a reverse discrimination suit in which male employees received less pregnancy benefits than female employees. Id. at 674. See also MillerWohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981)
vacated on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1088 (1982) (district court held that the PDA did
not preempt Montana's Maternity Leave Act which required employers to reinstate
employees after a reasonable maternity leave).
62. Newport, 462 U.S. at 672.
63. Id. at 685.
64. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694. Section 12945(b)(2) is not a parenting leave statute. Id. See also Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th Cir. 1985) for the Court of Appeals
analysis of § 12945(b)(2) as not being a parenting leave statute.
65. See Note, Pregnancy Hazards, supra note 29 at 520 n.28 (1986). Section
12945(b)(2) is not based on stereotypical assumptions that women need pregnancy
leaves. Id. Under § 12945(b)(2), pregnant workers are not automatically entitled to
the maximum four month leave. Id. Pregnant workers can only take a leave for medical reasons relating to pregnancy. Id. See supra note 7 for the text of § 12945(b)(2).
66. Newport, 462 U.S. at 685.
67. The Newport Court also determined that although complete pregnancy insurance may cost more'than underinclusive pregnancy insurance, the cost differential
is necessary to equalize the burdens of reproduction. Id. at 685 n.26. (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.9(e)). The rule states that, "it shall not be a defense under Title VII to a
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Unlike the district court," the Guerra Court did not allow the
Newport holding to prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy
under the PDA. Preferential treatment should be allowed in situations where women have different needs then men. To support this
notion, the Guerra Court analyzed the scope of the PDA. The Court
determined that treating pregnancy favorably in certain situations
did not frustrate the purpose of Title VII or compel employers to
violate Title VII. 9
The core of the Guerra Court's interpretation of the PDA was
that Congress never intended to preempt state fair employment laws
that furthered the goals of Title VII.70 The PDA is part of Title
charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other." Id. See also Stewart, Equal Treatment for Pregnant Workers, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 45 (statistical analysis of small employer
costs for providing pregnancy disability leaves). Eighteen weeks of leave for a word
processing employee would cost an employer an additional $1,747 in St. Louis; $3,363
in Houston; and $5,186 in Washington, D.C. Id. A survey of employer benefits at 700
firms found that only 19% of the companies surveyed had a formal pregnancy leave
policy, while 31% integrated pregnancy leave into their general sick leave policies,
and 27% claimed they met employee needs informally. Id. See generally Guerra, 758
F.2d at 395 (discussing Newport's impact on benefits cost analysis).
68. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 688. The district court stated: "California employers
who comply with the state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits under Title
VII brought by temporarily disabled males who do not receive the same treatment as
female employees disabled by pregnancy .... ." Id.
The district court did not understand that pregnancy will not disable men. Men
will, however, be temporarily disabled by other illnesses such as broken bones or prostatitis. Women will also suffer temporary disabilities such as broken bones or breast
cancer. Under these circumstances, temporary disabilities should be treated equally.
Pregnancy, however, should not be denied different treatment just because men will
never experience pregnancy disability. See Note, Employment Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985) (advocating different
treatment to accommodate pregnancy).
69. The plain language of the PDA seems to conflict with a preferential treatment approach to pregnancy. See supra note 1 for the PDA's complete text. The
PDA, however, does not expressly prohibit preferential treatment. See supra note 1
and infra note 89 to compare the language of § 701(k) of Title VII and § 703(j) of
Title VII. The Guerra Court went~beyond the plain meaning of the PDA to determine if Congress intended to prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. at 691.
An examination of the legislative history of the PDA was only minimal help to
the Guerra Court. Congress did not specifically address a preferential treatment situation. Id. at 692. Congress did intend, however, to put an end to pregnancy discrimination in employment. Id. See supra note 48 (remarks of legislators supporting the
PDA).
On the other hand, there was evidence that Congress did not intend that employers would be required to treat pregnancy in any particular or special manner. See
supra note 49 (remarks of legislators explaining the effects of the PDA). The Guerra
Court weighed this evidence and determined if Congress had intended to totally prohibit preferential treatment, Congress would not have only discussed its intention not
to require preferential treatment. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 693 (emphasis in original).
Certainly, some language would have been added to the PDA if Congress intended to
prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy.
70. The preemptive provisions of Title VII were designed to eradicate inconsistent state laws. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 (1983) (Title VII did
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VII. 1 Congress' goal in enacting Title VII was to end employment
discrimination and to achieve equal employment opportunities for
all individuals." Title VII does not require "sameness" of treatment." Unlike unlawful protective legislation,7 4 the FEHA did not
limit women in their employment opportunities. Rather, the requirement of reinstatement after a reasonable pregnancy leave removed an obstacle that had barred pregnant workers from participating equally in the workplace. 75 Women in California now have
the opportunity to participate equally with men in the workplace,
have families, and retain their jobs,"' which all serve to further the
not preempt a New York statute which prohibited discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy prior to the enactment of the PDA because the New York statute was not
inconsistent with Title VII). See Pervel Indus. v. Connecticut Comm. on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (D. Conn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1031 (1980) (although Connecticut's anti-discrimination law was consistent with Title
VII, this consistency did not save the law from being inconsistent with the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ["ERISA"] and ERISA, therefore
preempted Connecticut's anti-discrimination law).
71. The PDA should be read together with § 703(a). See supra notes 1 and 4 for
the complete text of both sections. See also supra notes 44 and 45 and the accompanying text for the construction analysis of the PDA.
72. For the purpose of Title VII, see supra note 52.
73. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted, "We are
not the first court to announce that the goal of Title VII is equality of employment
oppourtunity, not necessarily sameness of treatment." Guerra, 758 F.2d at 396 n.7.
See also United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title VII did
not forbid private employers from adopting affirmative action plans); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (facially neutral policies cannot be maintained if
they operate to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory practices); La Riviere v.
EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982) (states as well as employers may adopt
affirmative action plans); Miller-Wohi Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp.
1264 (D. Mont. 1981) vacated on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1982) (Montana's preferential pregnancy statute is not inconsistent with the purpose of Title
VII). See generally Kreiger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
Rav. 513 (1983) (for a discussion of the inadequacies of an equal treatment approach).
74. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694 n.28 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), exclusion of men from state nursing school was held invalid
because there was no showing that women had lacked opportunities in nursing). See
also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (outdated stereotyped assumptions, such as viewing women, and not men, as dependant spouses, cannot be used to
justify dissimilar treatment of women and men); Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F. 2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 163 (1976) (Title VII
superceded a provision of the California Labor Code which required employers to pay
overtime to female employees, but did not extend the same benefit to male employees); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (Title VII struck
down weight lifting restrictions); Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal.
1972) (Title VII preempted labor regulation granting rest periods to female employees, but not to male employees); Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 231, 240 (1967) (separate dormitories or toilet facilities do not imply inferiority); Comment, Developments in Title
VII, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1186 (1971) (for a thorough discussion of state protective
laws and Title VII).
75. See infra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of
Title VII.
76. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
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goals of Title VII.
Although the Guerra Court did not define the exact boundaries
of what is permissible and impermissible under the PDA, states now
have accurate guidelines for accomodating pregnancy in their laws
and policies. Same or equal treatment is the minimum requirement
of the PDA.7 7 This requirement influenced subsequent Supreme
Court decisions. 78 States that desire to accommodate pregnancy differently than other disabilities, must limit their benefits to the actual physical pregnancy disability.79 If a state desires a broader
parenting leave policy, the state must extend the same or equal benefits to males, as well as females.8 0 If a state elects to treat pregnancy favorably, a state does not have to extend similar benefits to
other temporarily disabled employees. 81 Thus, the Guerra Court
helped to settle a confused area of the law.
Although the Court's analysis adequately decided the issue, the
Guerra Court could have analogized favorable treatment of pregnancy to similar affirmative action cases. The majority presumably
did not make the analogy to affirmative action because of the adverse public reaction previous affirmative action opinions had
evoked. California's law requiring preferential treatment of pregnancy, however, is not an affirmative action plan."8 Affirmative ac77. Newport, 462 U.S. at 685.
78. Exactly one week after the Guerra decision, the Court decided Wimberly v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987). Although the Wimberly Court construed § 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and not
Title VII, the Court held that § 3304(a)(12) prohibited discrimination against pregnancy but did not mandate preferential treatment in favor of pregnancy. The Court
heard the case because two states had interpreted § 3304(a)(12) differently. Id. South
Carolina characterized pregnancy as good cause to receive unemployment compensation. Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150
(1983). Missouri, on the other hand, included pregnancy under the neutral general
disability clause that made pregnant women ineligible to collect unemployment compensation. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824. The Court upheld Missouri's same treatment
approach, but never specifically overruled South Carolina's special treatment approach. Id. at 828. See generally Barnett, Pregnancy Discrimination, TRIAL, July,
1987, at 38. (for an article discussing the impact the Guerra decision had upon the
Wimberly decision).
79. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
80. Id. The proposition that broader parenting leave benefits must be given
equally to men and women can be inferred from the Court's remark that §
12945(b)(2) is narrowly drawn to cover only the actual physical disability brought on
by pregnancy. Id. See supra note 65 (discussing medical pregnancy leaves).
81. Guerra , 107 S. Ct. at 697 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. 82. Affirmative action is a remedial measure imposed by the courts, Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974), or voluntarily adopted
by employers, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) to correct or remove obstacles that have acted as barriers to the achievement of equal opportunity goals. See also United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (most recent Supreme Court case reaffirming a court order to implement an affirmative action
plan).
In Guerra, California made a public policy choice when enacting the preferential
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tion is a remedy for blatant discrimination practices and for facially
neutral policies that have a disparate impact on an identifiable
group of individuals."3 Although the Guerra Court was confronted
with Cal Fed's facially neutral leave policy, 4 the majority declined
to comment on whether section 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a
legislative response to neutral leave policies that had a disparate impact on pregnant workers. 8 Justice Stevens, however, concurring
with the majority, compared the lawfulness of preferential treatment of pregnancy under the PDA to the lawfulness of affirmative
action under Title VII.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens 8 noted that United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber,"' one of the leading cases addressing affirmative action, was strikingly similar to the Guerra
Court's dilemma. In Weber, an employer voluntarily adopted an affirmative action plan which reserved fifty percent of the openings in
a training program for black employees. 8 The issue was whether an
employer could voluntarily prefer blacks over whites without violating Title VII's prohibition against race discrimination and section
703(j)'s8 9 prohibition against preferential treatment. The Weber
treatment approach to pregnancy. Therefore, California's approach to pregnancy is a
public policy choice and not a remedy. However, the similarities between preferential
treatment and affirmative action are worth noting. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the similarities between preferential treatment and
affirmative action.
83. Affirmative action is a remedy for individual claims that allege that an employer practice treats one group of individuals better than another or that an employer practice, which is facially neutral, has a disparate impact on one identifiable
group of individuals over another. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (discussing the difference between disparate
treatment and disparate impact). Proof of discriminatory motive is critical under a
disparate treatment theory; proof of discriminatory motive is not required under a
disparate impact theory. Id. Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts.
Id.
84. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 688.
85. Id. at 695 n.32. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Guerra
that this case only involved a challenge to the facial validity of § 12945(b)(2). Guerra,
758 F.2d at 394. The only issue involved was a question of law on cross-motions for
summary judgment. Id. Neither party had alleged or raised any factual questions on a
disparate impact theory. The Guerra Court concluded that because the PDA did not
prohibit all preferential treatment of pregnancy, the Court did not need to decide
whether § 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a proper legislative response to leave policies that had a disparate impact on pregnant workers. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 695 n.32.
86. Id. at 696 n.2.
87. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).
88. Id. at 198.
89. Id. at 200, 205 n.5. Section 703(0) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976),
provides in part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
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Court held that Title VII does not prohibit preferential treatment of
blacks.90
The reasoning the Guerra Court employed in reaching a similar
conclusion closely paralleled that of the Weber Court. In Weber, as
Justice Stevens noted, the plain language of section 703(a) of Title
VII appeared to mandate equal treatment.9 The legislative history
also mandated equal treatment." Moreover, Congress did not consider the consequences of a completely neutral rule."' Finally, there
was evidence that Congress did not intend to require preferential
treatment. 9' The Weber Court concluded, however, that Congress
did not intend to prohibit all preferential treatment." This conclusion was based on the fact that Congress enacted Title VII to
achieve equal employment opportunity and to remove barriers,
which appeared in the form of facially neutral policies, that have
historically operated to favor one group of employees over another."
Affirmative action and preferential treatment of pregnancy, in
certain circumstances, further the goal of equal employment opportunities. 97 The Weber decision and many other subsequent decisions
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
employer ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).

90. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
91. See supra note 4 for the complete text of § 703(a).
92. For a thorough analysis of the legislative history of Title VII, with an emphasis on a same treatment approach, see Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
93. Congress' attention was focused on the plight of the black worker and discrimination against the black worker. Id. at 202.
94. Id. at 205. The Weber Court stated that if Congress meant to prohibit all
race-conscious affirmative action, Congress would have provided that Title VII would
not require or permit racially preferential treatment. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 206.
96. Id. at 208. The Weber Court found that the employer's affirmative action
plan was consistent with Title VII because both were designed to break down old
patterns of racial segregation and to open employment opportunities for blacks which
had been traditionally closed to them. Id.
97. The Weber affirmative action case devised a four-part test which distinguished a permissible affirmative action plan from an impermissible affirmative action plan. A permissible affirmative action plan must be designed to break down old
patterns of racial discrimination; the plan must not unnecessarily trammel the interests of other employees; the plan must not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of other employees; and the plan must be a temporary measure. Id. at 208. This test
has been reaffirmed in Johnson v. Transportation Agency Santa Clara County, Cal.,
107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) (county transportation agency's affirmative action plan was
voluntarily adopted to attain a balance between the sexes in its work force); United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (Court ordered affirmative action plan to
achieve a racial balance in Alabama's state police force affirmed); La Riviere v.
EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirmative action plan to remedy longstanding
male-female imbalance in the California Highway Patrol affirmed). See supra notes
77-81 and accompanying text discussing the limitations the PDA places upon states.
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support this proposition." By analogizing affirmative actions cases
to the Guerra case, the Court could have supported the holding that
preferential treatment of pregnancy is consistent with Title VII.
The Guerra Court's timely interpretation of the PDA has firmly
resolved the issue that preferential treatment of pregnancy is lawful
under Title VII. The holding that the PDA mandates equal treatment, but does not prohibit preferential treatment, has already impacted caselaw." Consequently, states now have accurate guidelines,100 which enable them to correctly tailor their fair employment
laws and policies. States are further assured that they have the
power to favorably accomodate the condition of pregnancy in their
laws, while not conflicting with federal law. Finally, and most important, women will confidently know that the birth of one career does
not require the end of another.
Judith Gallo

98. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (dominant purpose of
Title VII is to root out discrimination in employment); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219 (1982) (primary objective of Title VII is to bring employment opportunities);

Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (the statute speaks, not in terms of jobs and
promotions, but in terms of limitations and classifications that would deprive any
individual of employment opportunities); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) (paramount concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was the elimination
of employment discrimination).
99. See supra note 78 for a discussion of the Wimberly case.
100. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text for the PDA guidelines af-

fecting states.

